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Abstract—Current digital currency schemes provide instanta-
neous exchange on precise commodity, in which ”precise” means
a buyer can possibly verify the function of the commodity without
error. However, imprecise commodities, e.g. statistical data, with
error existing are abundant in digital world. Existing digital
currency schemes do not offer a mechanism to help the buyer for
payment decision on precision of commodity, which may lead the
buyer to a dilemma between having to buy and being unconfident.
In this paper, we design a currency schemes IDCS for imprecise
digital commodity. IDCS completes a trade in three stages of
handshake between a buyer and providers. We present an IDCS
prototype implementation that assigns weights on the trustworthy
of the providers, and calculates a confidence level for the buyer to
decide the quality of a imprecise commodity. In experiment, we
characterize the performance of IDCS prototype under varying
impact factors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital currency plays an important role on today’s online
transaction processing. In past years, research and business
community have proposed many digital currency schemes,
e.g., [10][11][12][13], for various application scenarios. Those
schemes provide instantaneous transaction and ownership
transfer on precise commodity, in which ”precise” means per-
fect conformity to fact or truth that a buyer can possibly verify
the function of the commodity without error. Meanwhile, there
exists uncountably imprecise data with error existing in digital
world. For instance, statistics, e.g., Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), usually collected from multiple sources, are easily
influenced by negligence, limited manpower or even falsi-
fication. However, existing digital currency schemes do not
have a mechanism to help the buyer to judge and pay on the
precision of data. As a consequence, when taking the imprecise
data as digital commodity for trade, the buyer may not have
enough information to determine if the source or provider is
trustworthy (or which provider is more trustworthy), and thus
has no idea on the precision of the data he needs to buy. Once
the buyer has paid for erroneous data, he can hardy get the cash
back. To help the trade of imprecise commodity proceeding
normally, it is desired to give support to the trading process
in scheme level.
To realize a digital currency scheme on imprecise com-
modity, we have found the challenges lie in establishing
the trustworthy relationship between buyer and providers.
Consider that a trading process is happening. Initially, the
buyer does not know anything about the imprecise commodity
and providers, and he would need additional information as
decision aid. The difficulty in scheme design is the scheme
also starts with zero knowledge on the commodity and the
providers. Without prior knowledge, the scheme can hardy
help the buyer to rate the trustworthiness of the providers
as well as to find the truth out of the commodity’s views
given by the providers. Then, another challenge as the trading
process goes is when the buyer still holds doubtful attitude
before payment, how can the scheme help the buyer to prompt
his confidence on choice; otherwise, the buyer may be caught
in a dilemma between having to buy and being unconfident.
Finally, once the buyer decides to pay for a provided view of
the commodity believed to be the truth, it is also important
for the scheme to determine a fair distribution of payment to
the providers while preventing the buyer from being deceived
by malicious providers.
In this paper, we set out to tackle the challenges in realizing
digital currency scheme on imprecise commodity. In particular,
we are interested in paying for the truth while identifying ma-
licious providers that may probably disrupt currency exchange
system from the buyer’s side. As a summary, this paper makes
the following contributions:
• We design a Currency Scheme for Imprecise Digital
commodity (IDCS) that completes a trade through three-
stage processing between a buyer and providers.
• We present an IDCS prototype implementation that as-
signs weights to the providers according to their trust-
worthy, and calculates a confidence level for the buyer to
decide the quality of a commodity view.
• We experiment under varying impact factors, which char-
acterizes the performance of our IDCS prototype.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
introduce the preliminaries in Section II. We formally present
IDCS in Section III. We describe an IDCS prototype imple-
mentation in Section IV. We provide experimental results in
Section V. We review related work in Section VI. Finally, we
conclude our paper in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section outlines the preliminaries of IDCS, including
adversary model, weight model, and payment model. All
of these models exhibit the relationship between buyer and
providers.
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A. Adversary Model
We assume the malicious providers behave in a Byzantine
manner, i.e., supplying the imprecise view of digital commod-
ity arbitrarily. The providers are independent of each other, i.e.,
they do not collude to supply a same bias view of a commodity.
(Otherwise, the providers can be divided into independent
groups such that any two providers belong to different groups
give unrelated views. Here we omit the dependent case in
model assumption.) In addition, a provider may also supply
a imprecise view due to negligence or limited manpower,
besides out of malicious intent.
We assume both the buyer and the ledger server that acts
as an intermediary between the buyer and the providers are
honest. The buyer indeed wants to purchase the commodity,
and does not purposely return the commodity back. The ledger
server processes the trade faithfully following the specification
of IDCS. The case of dishonest buyer or ledger server is quite
different in assumption with the honest case, which needs a
entirely different scheme on trade. In this paper, we simplify
the assumption, and choose to purely focus on the digital
currency from the buyer’s honest side.
B. Weight Model
IDCS weights the reliability of the providers. The weights
are derived based on the evaluation of trading commodities. At
the beginning, IDCS starts with zero weights on the providers.
As trades happen, IDCS incrementally adjusts weights accord-
ing to the evaluation results on commodities supplied by the
providers. The underlying principle is more reliable providers
supply more trustworthy views on a commodity, and thus
should be assigned with higher weights. Here we consider
the single truth scenario, i.e., although the providers supply
different views of a commodity, there is only one truth view.
Suppose that there are total m providers supplying their views
v1, v2, ..., vm on a commodity v separately. The weight model
calculates a estimated truth view v∗ by the following equation:
v∗ =
∑m
i=1 wivi∑m
i=1 wi
(1)
where wi, i = 1, 2, ...,m, are the weights for the providers.
v∗ is averaged by adopting provider weights as view weights.
In Section IV-A, we will present an implementation of weight
model in our IDCS prototype.
C. Payment Model
All the trades are proceeded through a ledger server. The
process of a trade is started from the buyer. When a buyer
wants to purchase a commodity, he firstly specifies a payment
mode and registers it on the ledger server. Then if a provider
accepts the payment mode, the provider can supply a view
of the commodity to the ledger server and apply for payment.
Finally, the trade is done after the buyer confirms the payment
for the supplied view on the ledger server. Suppose that there
are total m providers supplying their views v1, v2, ..., vm on
buyer
ledger 
server m providers… 
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Fig. 1. IDCS completes a trade in three stages. In the 1st stage, the buyer
declares payment mode PM for a commodity v; then the ledger server notifies
(or posts) it to the providers. In the 2nd stage, a total of m providers supply
their views v1, v2, ..., vm for v; then the ledger server estimates a truth view
v∗, calculates a confidence level cl as an evaluation of quality on v∗, and
send cl to the buyer. In the 3rd stage, If the buyer admits the confidence
level cl, he sends the confirmation back to the ledger server; on receiving the
confirmation, the ledger server sends the estimated truth view v∗ to the buyer
and completes payment by PM . Else if the buyer is not satisfied with the
confidence level cl, he is allowed to redeclare PM by changing the payment
functions and increasing payment, and the trading process returns to the 1st
stage.
a commodity v separately. Formally, we define the payment
function as follow:
[c1, c2, ..., cm] = p(C,W, V ) (2)
where W = {w1, w2, ..., wm} includes the weights assigned to
views, V = {v1, v2, ..., vm} and c1, c2, ..., cm,
∑m
i=1 ci = C,
are the distribution of currency to the m providers respectively.
In Section IV-B, we introduce three payment functions for
evaluation of our IDCS prototype.
III. IMPRECISE DIGITAL CURRENCY SCHEME (IDCS)
IDCS completes a trade through three-stage processing
between the buyer and the providers (Figure 1). All of the
three stages use a ledger server as trusted intermediary. We
describe them in details as follows:
• 1st stage: the buyer declares payment mode PM for a
commodity v:
PM(v) =

p1(C1,W, V ) cl ≤ cl1
p2(C2,W, V ) cl1 < cl ≤ cl2
......
pn(Cn,W, V ) cl > cln−1
(3)
where cl1, cl2, ..., cln−1 are the confidence levels
that mark off different payment functions, i.e., given
p(0,W, V ), cl ≤ 0.5, the buyer will not pay if the
confidence level is below or equal to 0.5, whereas given
p(100,W, V ), cl > 0.5, the buyer pay 100 currency units
according the specification of function p and weights W
if the confidence level is greater than 0.5. The buyer
registers PM on the ledger server. Then, the ledger server
notifies or posts PM to the providers.
• 2nd stage: If a provider accepts the payment mode
PM , he could supply his view of the commodity to
the ledger server. Suppose there are total m providers
that supply their views v1, v2, ..., vm. The ledger server
assigns weights w1, w2, ..., wm according the reliability
of the providers, and estimates a truth view v∗ (Equation
(1)) based on the weight assignment. Then, the ledger
server evaluates the quality of view v∗ by calculating
a confidence level cl, and send it to the buyer for
confirmation.
• 3rd stage: If the buyer admits the confidence level cl,
he sends the confirmation back to the ledger server. The
ledger server sends the estimated truth view v∗ (Equation
(1)) to the buyer, and completes the payment to the
providers by the payment mode PM . Else if the buyer
is not satisfied with the confidence level cl, he is allowed
to redeclare PM by changing the payment functions
and increasing payment, i.e., ∀cli−1 < cl ≤ cli, the
redeclared payment function p′i(C
′
i,W, V ) has C
′
i ≥ Ci.
With redeclaration, the trading process returns to the 1st
stage.
IV. IDCS PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
As can be seen in Section III, the process of IDCS relies on
the weight assignment and evaluation on the providers. In this
section, we present an implemented prototype of IDCS that
assigns weights to the providers based on the quality of the
views their supply and calculate the confidence level for the
buyer. Then, we introduce a practical case on IDCS prototype.
A. An Implemented Method on Weight Assignment
The weights are assigned according to the error of the
supplied views. When a provider just joins in, the implemented
system of IDCS has no knowledge on the provider. The ledger
server initially starts several trades on imprecise commodities,
the ground truth view of which are already known, with
the provider. Then, IDCS can assesses the reliability of the
providers by deriving the mean error µ and error variance
σ2 on the views they supply. Let S denote the set of views
corresponding to the series of trades started by the ledger
server. For a provider, we have:
µ =
∑
s∈S d(s
g − s)
|V | (4)
σ2 =
∑
s∈S(µ− s)2
|V | (5)
  −eT eTµ∗1 µ∗2
(µ∗1, σ
∗2
1 )
(µ∗1, σ
∗2
2 ) (µ
∗
2, σ
∗2
2 )
Fig. 2. An example on Gaussian distribution.
where d(sg−s) is the distance between the ground truth sg and
the view s supplied by the provider. Then, as the provider joins
in subsequent practical trades, IDCS can incrementally adjust
µ and σ2 according to the quality of views on commodities
supplied by the provider.
We assume that providers are independent of each other
(otherwise they can divided into independent groups) in the ad-
versary model (Section II-A). Thereupon, we can use Gaussian
distribution to describe the error on the views of commodities
supplied by the providers. Suppose that there are total m
providers. For the ith provider, we have:
ei ∼ G(µi, σ2i ) (6)
For a commodity v, IDCS applies the weighted averaging
strategy (Equation (1)) to calculate a estimated truth view v∗.
With the assumption that the providers are independent of each
other, we have the error e∗ of view v∗ following Gaussian
distribution:
e∗ ∼ G(
∑m
i=1 wiµi∑m
i=1 wi
,
∑m
i=1 w
2
i σ
2
i
(
∑m
i=1 wi)
2
) (7)
Without loss of generality, we restrict
∑m
i=1 wi = 1. Suppose
that we have an error threshold value eT . The objective of
weight assignment in IDCS is to maximize the probability
P (|e∗| < eT ):
max P (|e∗| < eT )
s.t.
∑m
i=1 wi = 1, wi ≥ 0.
(8)
Let µ∗ =
∑m
i=1 wiµi∑m
i=1 wi
and σ∗ =
∑m
i=1 w
2
i σ
2
i
(
∑m
i=1 wi)
2 . In Figure 2, we
have µ∗1 < µ
∗
2 and σ
∗
1 < σ
∗
2 . As can be seen, under the Gaus-
sian distribution G(µ∗1, σ
∗2
1 ), P (|e∗| < eT ) has a greater value
compared with the other two distributions. In other words, to
maximize P (|e∗| < eT ), the views should be weighted with
the smallest combination of |µ∗| and σ∗. Substituting Gaussian
probability-density function in P (|e∗| < eT ), we have:
P (|e∗| < eT ) =
∫ eT
−eT
1√
2piσ∗
Exp(− (e
∗ − µ∗)
2σ∗2
) d e∗ (9)
Unfortunately, it can be verified that the objective of maxi-
mizing P (|e∗| < eT ) with Equation (9) cannot be directly
solved. As a consequence, we are unable to derive the smallest
combination of µ∗ and σ∗ straightly.
Consider that if the error ei of a view vi is more likely
between the interval [−eT , eT ] (namely a greater value of
P (|ei| < eT )), then the view vi is more trustworthy. We apply
an approximate weight assignment:
wi ∝ P (|ei| < eT ) (10)
Normalize the weight assignment with the constraint of∑m
i=1 wi = 1. For e
∗, its weight assignment is:
wi =
P (|ei| < eT )∑m
j=1 P (|ej | < eT )
(11)
We set the confidence level cl = P (|e∗| < eT ) for IDCS,
which means that the error e∗ of the estimated view v∗ has
the probability of cl between interval [−eT , eT ].
B. GDP Dataset Case on IDCS Prototype
Here we introduce a case of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
dataset on our IDCS prototype. Usually, GDP statistics are
collected from multiple sources (or to say providers), and their
precisions are easily influenced by external force, e.g. limited
manpower, falsification.
1) The GDP Dataset: We choose the GDP statistics of
China in 1994 - 2014 [2] as example. The GDP statistics
contain 3 independent parts, statistics by the expenditure
approach, income approach, and productive approach respec-
tively. These statistics are listed in Table I. We have the
following relationship of statistics:
GDP EA = FCE +GCF +NE
GDP IA = NPT +WC +DFA+BB
GDP PA = FI + SI + TI
(12)
All of these statistics can be provided as indicators for GDP
growth. We take them as views of GDP growth rate (from 1995
to 2014). Since we do not actually know the most trustworthy
view, we choose GDP PA as the ground truth. The mean error
and standard deviation of the other views to GDP PA are also
listed in Table I. Note that the statistics of GDP FA, FCE,
GCF, and NE in 2014, the statistics of GDP IA, NPT, WC,
DFA and BB in 2004, 2008, and 2011-2014 are not given in
the official site of National Bureau of Statistics [2]. We use
the GDP growth rate of their previous year to fill these blanks.
2) The Reference Weight Methods: We implement four
other weight methods besides IDCS weight (IDCSW) method
(Section IV-A) as references for evaluation of IDCS prototype.
Two of these methods are Mean and Median:
• Mean: assign weight 1 to the views v1, v2, ..., vm to
estimate v∗ (Equation (1)).
• Median: assign weight 1 to the view of median value
(when m%2 = 1) or the two views of median value
(when m%2 = 0), and weight 0 to the other views to
estimate v∗.
Also, we can find a great lot of truth-finding methods
[5][6][14][18][19] in research literatures. The basic idea be-
hind them can be mainly concluded into two categories:
finding the most likely value by manipulating the data itself,
TABLE I
VIEWS ON GDP GROWTH RATE
Views Full Name Mean
Error
Standard
Deviation
FCE Final Consumption Expendi-
ture
2.4069 1.5291
GCF Gross Capital Formation 3.8193 2.9389
NE Net Exports 33.6287 34.5794
GDP EA GDP by The Expenditure Ap-
proach
1.2462 0.9685
NPT Net Production Tax 3.9390 3.4461
WC Worker Compensation 4.1153 5.3371
DFA Depreciation of Fixed Assets 3.6984 2.3672
BB Business Balance 10.7253 14.3010
GDP IA GDP by The Income Approach 3.0893 3.6595
FI GDP of The First Industry 4.8382 3.2961
SI GDP of The Secondary Indus-
try
1.6570 1.1663
TI GDP of The Tertiary Industry 2.6926 1.9201
GDP PA GDP by The Productive Ap-
proach
0 0
TABLE II
ERROR PAYMENT OF GDP DATASET CASE
Error Payment (1, 1) (3, 1
d
) (m, 1
d2
)
IDCSW 1.5000 1.0295 1.0678
Mean 1.7000 1.5963 1.4956
Median 1.5000 1.1242 1.2180
3-voting 1.8000 1.3826 1.5112
3-sources 1.9000 1.7080 1.5810
and calculating the final result based on the reliability of
sources. Thus, we implement two methods, K-voting and K-
sources, in spirit related to the two categories respectively.
• K-voting: Let any two views vi and vj vote their distance
d(vi, vj) to each other, and assign weight 1 to the k views
nearest to all the other views and weight 0 to the other
views to estimate v∗.
• K-sources: Based on prior information, assign weight 1
to the k most trustworthy views and weight 0 to the other
views to estimate v∗.
In our GDP dataset case, the distance d(vi, vj) is equal to the
difference of GDP growth rate between vi and vj . For the K-
voting and K-sources method, we set k = 3, and let the prior
information of K-sources method be the randomly selected 10
years’ statistics by default. For IDCSW method, we initially
starts 10 trade for each of 10 years’ statistics as well, and set
eT = 1 in confidence level cl calculation.
3) The Payment Functions: We implement three payment
functions for evaluation of weight methods in error distribution
of currency. The three payment functions are different in the
number of providers who receive payment. Suppose that <
v(1), v(2), ..., v(m) > is the sorted sequence in ascending order
according to the distance d(v(i), v∗), i = 1, 2, ...,m.
• (1, 1): the provider of view v(1) gets all the C currency
units.
• (3, 1d ): the provider of view v(1), v(2) and v(3) get
c(i) =
C·∏3k=1,k 6=i d(v(k),v∗)∑3
j=1
∏3
k=1,k 6=j d(v(k),v∗)
, i = 1, 2, 3, currency units
respectively.
• (m, 1d2 ): the provider of view v(1), v(2), ..., v(m) get
c(i) =
C·∏mk=1,k 6=i d2(v(i),v∗)∑m
j=1
∏m
k=1,k 6=j d2(v(j),v∗)
, i = 1, 2, ...,m, currency
units respectively.
4) The Evaluation Results: To describe the quality of
results, we define the error payment ePM :
ePM =
m∑
i=1
|c(i) − c(i)g | (13)
where c(i) and c(i)g are the amount of currency distributed to
the ith provider by the payment function using the distance
d(v(i), v
∗) and d(v(i), vg). (Recall that vg is the ground truth
view.)
Let the trading commodity v be the average GDP growth
rate from 1995 to 2014. All the 12 statistics of GDP growth
rate in Table I are the providers that supply their views of
commodity v. Assume the buyer accepts the results (or to say
the confidence level) calculated by the weight methods, and
confirms the payment C = 1 with the function (1, 1), (3, 1d )
and (m, 1d2 ) respectively. We list the error payment of IDCS
under weight method IDCSW, Mean, Median, 3-voting and
3-sources in Table II. As can be seen, IDCSW has the least
error payment among the weight methods. However, the result
given by IDCSW also has a low confidence level cl = 22.30%
(cl = P (|e∗| < eT ), Section IV-A), which means that the
quality of the GDP statistics supplied by the providers should
be improved.
V. EXPERIMENT
To characterize the performance of IDCS, we manipulate
the GDP dataset under three varying factors:
• Malicious Provider mp: the number of malicious
providers that manipulate the supplied views to prevent
the buyer from finding the truth;
• Manipulation Factor mf : the degree of multiplying factor
to the original view, i.e., v′i = mf · vi;
• Improvement Factor if : the degree of accuracy improve-
ment with per currency unit, using the following equation
|vi(j + 1)− vg|
|vi(j)− vg| = 1− a · e
if ·(j+1) (14)
where the ith provider with the payment j + 1 currency
unit can supply the view 1− a · eif ·(j+1) approaching to
the ground truth view vg compared with the payment j
currency unit.
The Equation (14) is raised with the intuition that the accuracy
improvement by means of incentivization is at the fastest
rate initially, and then slows down with more payment. In
Experiment, we set a = 0.1. The other experimental settings
follow the setup in Section IV-B1 by default.
A. Varying Malicious Providers
Here the experiments are conducted under varying malicious
providers mp = 3, 6, 9 and 12. The manipulation factor
mf is set to 1.2. In experiment, the malicious views are
randomly selected by 10 times for each mp = 3, 6, 9. The error
payments of function (1, 1), (3, 1d ) and (m,
1
d2 ) with C = 1 are
shown in Table III. From the comparison results, we can see
that (1) the error payment grows as the malicious providers
increase; (2) the error payment decreases as the number of
providers who receive payment increase; (3) IDCSW perform
best among these methods (except for the mp = 12 case that
all the providers are with malicious intent), since IDCSW
considers both mean and variance of error in its design.
Besides, when changing the manipulation factor mf under
malicious providers mp = 3, 6, 9, 12, we can get similar
results.
B. Varying Manipulation Factor
In this sub-section, we experiment on varying manipulation
factor mf = 1.4 and 1.6. (The case mf = 1.2 can be
seen in previous sub-section.) The malicious providers mp,
randomly selected by 10 times, is set to 6. The error payments
of function (1, 1), (3, 1d ) and (m,
1
d2 ) with C = 1 are shown
in Table IV. It can be seen that (1) the error grows in greater
rate when manipulation factor increases compared with the
change of malicious providers; (2) the error payment decreases
as the number of providers who receive payment increase; (3)
IDCSW has stable performance with the least error compared
with other methods.
C. Varying Improvement Factor
We experiment on varying improvement factor if = 0.1,
0, 2, 0.3 and 0.4. The manipulation factor mf is set to 1.6.
The results of malicious providers mp = 3 and mp = 6 are
shown in Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b) respectively. The results
show that (1) the confidence level grows faster when we have
smaller improvement factor; (2) to prompt the confidence to
the same level, the cost of currency units is greater in mv = 6
case compared with in mv = 3 case. In addition, we can get
similar results under other parameter settings.
VI. RELATED WORK
IDCS is related to the work on designing digital currency
scheme, resolving conflicts from multiple sources, and learn-
ing from crowd.
1) Designing digital currency scheme: Related studies
mainly focus on security issues in scheme designment. E-
cash [12] firstly proposes blind digital signatures for trading
with electronic currency units. Then later, it is extendedly
applied with other considerations, e.g. using RSA digital
signatures [13], constructing group blind signature scheme
[8], and sharing publicly verifiable secret [20]. Also, E-cash
scheme provides the ability of fair payment [7][9]. Bitcoin
[17] is the scheme that attracts the most attention recently. It
can be implemented with adding features, e.g. Litecoin [1],
Primecoin [3], and Zerocoin [16].
2) Resolving conflicts from multiple sources: An early
common conflicts resolution method [5][6][18] is to average
(or to say vote) those conflicts to calculate a truth. However,
this type of method suffers from large error when there exist
sources with low quality views. To deal with this problem,
TABLE III
ERROR PAYMENT UNDER VARYING MALICIOUS PROVIDERS mp
mp = 3
Method (1, 1) (3, 1
d
) (m, 1
d2
)
mp = 6
Method (1, 1) (3, 1
d
) (m, 1
d2
)
IDCSW 1.6000 1.2054 1.3383 IDCSW 1.7000 1.4981 1.4661
Mean 1.7000 1.4684 1.5294 Mean 1.8000 1.6265 1.5913
Median 1.6000 1.3427 1.4037 Median 1.8000 1.5767 1.5448
3-voting 1.8000 1.5941 1.6209 3-voting 2.0000 1.5120 1.5776
3-sources 2.0000 1.5788 1.5771 3-sources 1.8000 1.6108 1.5099
mp = 9
Method (1, 1) (3, 1
d
) (m, 1
d2
)
mp = 12
Method (1, 1) (3, 1
d
) (m, 1
d2
)
IDCSW 1.6000 1.5485 1.5022 IDCSW 1.7000 1.6188 1.5636
Mean 1.7000 1.6183 1.5265 Mean 1.7000 1.6271 1.5643
Median 1.9000 1.7862 1.6927 Median 1.9000 1.8202 1.6296
3-voting 1.9000 1.7734 1.6985 3-voting 2.0000 1.9759 1.7985
3-sources 1.8000 1.5427 1.5065 3-sources 1.9000 1.4977 1.5042
TABLE IV
ERROR PAYMENT UNDER VARYING MANIPULATION FACTOR mf
mf = 1.4
Method (1, 1) (3, 1
d
) (m, 1
d2
)
mf = 1.6
Method (1, 1) (3, 1
d
) (m, 1
d2
)
IDCSW 1.5000 1.4231 1.4747 IDCSW 1.8000 1.6008 1.5711
Mean 1.7000 1.6946 1.6824 Mean 1.8000 1.7164 1.6230
Median 2.0000 1.7839 1.7773 Median 2.0000 1.9067 1.6787
3-voting 2.0000 1.8414 1.8102 3-voting 2.0000 1.8704 1.7098
3-sources 1.7000 1.5274 1.5093 3-sources 1.8000 1.6648 1.5864
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Fig. 3. Confidence level under varying improvement factor if
many methods were proposed to find the truth based on
heuristic clues, i.e., prior knowledge on facts [19], source
dependency [14], sensitivity and specificity [23]. Usually, this
type of method uses the clues to evaluate the reliability of
sources, and calculate a truth by weighting the sources.
3) Learning from crowd: Learning from crowd is another
related field to out work. It infers true values from the data
labeled by a crowd. The methods [4][15][21][22] proposed
in this research field usually focus on specific application
scenarios.
VII. CONCLUSION
We propose IDCS for trading imprecise commodity. It
connects buyers and providers through a ledger server, and
completes a trade in three stages. We present IDCS prototype
implementation on weight assignment, and thus a confidence
level can be given for a buyer to decide the quality of a com-
modity view. In experiment, we characterize the performance
of IDCS prototype under varying impact factors.
In this paper, we assume that buyer and ledger server are
honest. In the future, we will consider the dishonest case that
buyer and ledger server are with malicious intent.
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